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Although England and Wales do not have 'the exclusionary rule' adopted by the United States 
Supreme Court, s.78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 allows the judge to exclude certain 
evidence based on unfairness in all the circumstances, including the illegality of the investigative 
procedures (Hungerford-Welch, Criminal Litigation &^_ Sentencing, 5th ed., Cavendish Publishing 
(2000), p.448-449; Davis, Croall, Tyrer, Criminal Justice, 2nd ed., Longman (1999), p.208). As the 
Human Rights Act 1998 came into force, the possibility that the defence challenge the admissibility 
of prosecution evidence alleging the breach of the European Convention of Human Rights seems to 
increase (Cheney, Dickson, Fitzpatrick, Uglow, Criminal Justice and The Human Rights Act 1998, 
Jordans (1999), p.24). The aim of this article is to compare the reasoning of and approaches to the 
exclusion of certain evidence in criminal litigation in England, in the United States, and in Japan.
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EXCLUSIONARY DISCRETION IN ENGLAND 
AND WALES
T here is both common law and statutory exclusionary discretion in England. In 1963, the Court of Appeal already held in R v Payne [1963] 1 
WLR 637, where following a car collision the accused was
' o
induced into providing a specimen of blood by the 
pretence that it was required to determine whether he was 
ill, whereas in reality the reason for obtaining it was to 
show that the accused had been drinking alcohol, that theo 7
evidence should have been excluded because if the accused 
had realised that the specimen would be used against him, 
he might have refused to subject himself to examination. 
However, the leading case on common law exclusionary 
discretion was R v Sang [1980] AC 402, where the accused 
contended that he had been induced to commit the 
offence by an informer acting on the instruction of the 
police, and that therefore the trial judge should exclude 
any evidence of the commission of the offence thus 
induced. Their Lordships held that the judge's function at 
a criminal trial was to ensure a fair trial according to the 
law, and therefore the judge had a discretion to exclude 
prosecution evidence to ensure the accused a fair trial
when the judge finds that the evidence's 'prejudicial effect 
outweighs its probative value'. However, because a court is 
not concerned with how evidence was obtained but merely 
with how it is used at the trial, a judge has no discretion to 
refuse to admit relevant admissible evidence merely 
because it has been obtained by improper or unfair means. 
If an informer induced the accused to commit the alleged 
crime and therefore evidence against the accused had been 
improperly obtained by the police, it could be a factor in 
mitigating the sentence imposed on the accused, and 
might also be a matter for civil or disciplinary action 
against the police, but it was not a ground on which the 
judge could exercise his discretion to exclude the evidence.
The House of Lords seems to hold that a judge may 
exclude the evidence to the extent that it disturbs the 
sound fact-finding capacity of the jury, or to the extent 
that it prevents the jury from finding the truth (see, 
Evidence, Inns of Court School of Law, 2000/2001, pp. 14-15). 
This means that the Lords handled the matter within the 
evidential principle.
On the other hand, s.78 of PACE 1984 provides that a 
judge may exclude evidence when
Amicus Curiae Issue 37 September/October 2001
'having regard to all the circumstances, including the 
circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission 
of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness 
of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it.'
The section overlaps with the common law exclusion, 
but the exclusion under s.78 might go beyond that 
because it is unfair if a court admits unreliable evidence, 
but the 'fairness of the proceedings' can also be challenged 
even if the evidence has ample probative value. Then what 
is the 'fairness of the proceedings'? Before studying the 
English cases, it is worth looking at American and Japanese 
approaches.
AMERICAN APPROACH
In 1914, the Supreme Court of the United States held 
in Weeks v United States, 232 US 383 (1914), where a 
government officer searched a defendant's room and 
seized certain letters without a warrant, that the evidence 
obtained without a warrant in violation of the 4th 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
could not be used as evidence against the defendant. The 
Court held that:
The effect of the 4th Amendment is to put the courts of the 
United States and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power 
and authority, under limitations and restraints as to the exercise 
of such power and authority, and tojbrever secure the people, 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against all 
unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law.'...
'The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the 
country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures ... 
should find no sanction in the judgments ojthe courts...'
... 'If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held 
and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offence, the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment, declaring his right to be 
secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value...'
It was the first case in which the opinion of the Court 
announced the exclusionary rule, but because it was based on 
no explicit requirement of the Amendment itself nor on 
Congressional legislation, and because the effect of the rule is, 
in a sense, shocking, in that, as Justice Cardozo once put it,
'[The] criminal ... go free because the constable had 
blundered (People v Defore, 242 NY 13, 2 1, 150 NE 
585,587 (1926);,'
The raison d'etre of the rule has been vigorously debated 
(see, for example, Alien, Kuhns, Stuntz, Constitutional 
Criminal Procedure, 3rd. ed. (1995), p. 902).
Since Weeks was a federal prosecution case interpreting 
the United States Constitution, the Court later addressed 
the question whether the exclusionary rule is inherently 
implicit in the 4th Amendment and is therefore binding 
on the states through the 14th Amendment Due Process 
Clause in Wolfv Colorado, 338 US 252 (1949). In that case, 
the Court held that the
'Security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the 
police ... which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment ... is 
basic to ajree society. [And] it is therefore ... enforceable 
against the States through the Due Process Clause. ... But the 
ways of enforcing such a basic right raise questions of a different 
order. ... [The Weeks ruling] was not derived from the explicit 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment; it was not based on 
legislation expressing Congressional policy in the enforcement of 
the Constitution. The decision was a matter of judicial 
implication. [W] E must hesitate to treat [the exclusionary rule] 
as an essential ingredient of the right.'
Then the Supreme Court reconsidered Wolf and 
overruled it in 1961 (Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 (1961)). 
The Court held that:
'The admission of the right [to privacy] could not consistently 
tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, 
the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had beenjorced to 
give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant 
the right, but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment.'
There, the Court recognised the exclusionary rule was 
'an essential part of the right to privacy (Mapp v Ohio, supra 
at 657).' The Court also pointed out, in replying to the 
'criminal goes free' criticism, that:
'There is another consideration .. . the imperative of judicial 
integrity. The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that 
sets him free.'...
'Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than itsjailure 
to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its 
own existence. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds 
contempt of law (Mapp v Ohio, supra at 660). '
Growing concern about crime must have had influence 
on the interpretation of the rule. The Supreme Court held 
in 1984 that:
"The substantial social costs exacted by the exclusionary rule for 
the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights have long been a source 
of concern (United States v Leon, 468 US 897, at 907 (1984))".
'The Fourth Amendment contains no provision expressly 
precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its 
commands ... The wrong condemned by the Amendment is fully 
accomplished by the unlawful search or seizure itself, and the 
exclusionary rule is neither intended nor able to cure the invasion 
of the defendant's rights which he has already suffered. The rule 
thus operates as a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard 
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, 
rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved. 
... Whether the exclusionary sanction is appropriately imposed in 
a particular case ... is an issue separate from the question 
whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to 
invoke the rule were violated by police conduct. Only the former 
question is currently before us, and it must be resolved by 
weighing the costs and benefits of preventing the use in the 
prosecution's case-in-chief of inherently trustworthy tangible 
evidence ... (United States v Leon, supra, at 906, 901).' 29
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Hence the exclusionary rule is derived from the 
protection of privacy, and we see three rationales of the 
rule indicated in these cases. The first one says that the rule 
is an implicit part of the Fourth Amendment. The second 
one says that the purpose of the rule is to maintain judicial 
integrity, while the third one claims the deterrent effect of 
the rule. The theory best based on principle is the first one 
because it states that the rule is a constitutional imperative. 
According to the second theory, a court would suppress the 
evidence to the extent that the suppression of the evidence 
is useful to maintain public confidence in the justice 
system, while the third one claims the suppression of the 
evidence only when the court can expect the deterrent 
effect of the suppression on future police conduct.
JAPANESE APPROACH
In Japan, the Constitution of Japan and the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, both of which are strongly influenced 
by Anglo-American law, regulate arrests, searches and 
seizures. Art. 3 5 of the Constitution of Japan, modelled on 
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, 
provides that the right of all persons to be secure in their 
homes, and their papers and effects against entries, 
searches and seizures shall not be impaired except upon 
warrant issued for probable cause, and describing the 
particular place to be searched and items to be seized.
Apart from the powers of search and seizure, a police 
officer has the power of stop and inspection (not search), 
being allowed to stop a person suspected of being involved 
in a crime, to question him, and to inspect his/her 
personal belongings if it is necessary to clear the suspicion. 
This power must be executed upon reasonable grounds 
for suspecting that a person is about to commit or has 
committed an offence, or that a person has some 
knowledge about an offence which is going to be
o o o
committed or has been committed. The inspection of a 
person's belongings cannot be made without the consent 
of that particular person being questioned.
In 1978, the Supreme Court of Japan announced that 
illegally obtained evidence had to be excluded from the 
prosecution evidence in certain circumstances, even though 
there is no provision of an exclusionary rule of tangible 
evidence. In that case, a police officer stopped a person for 
a suspicion of soliciting and drug dealing on the street. 
Having questioned him for a certain time, the officer frisked 
the person and felt something hard in an inside coat pocket. 
The officer requested him to show his belongings, which 
the person refused to do. After unsuccessfully trying to 
persuade him to do so, the officer put his hand into the 
pocket without his consent, and pulled out a metal case, 
which contained a hypodermic syringe and some white 
powder, which turned out to be meta-amphetamine. 
Referring to arts. 35 and 31 (Due Process Clause) of the 
Constitution, the Supreme Court held that a court had to 
exclude the prosecution evidence when the breach of the
la\v is so serious that the exclusion would be appropriate to 
prevent future police misconduct. To determine if the 
exclusion of specific evidence is appropriate or not, a court 
should take all the circumstances into account, e.g., 
seriousness of the offence, seriousness of the illegality of the 
police officer's conduct, the effect of the exclusion of 
evidence, the strength of prosecution's case, etc. (Saihan S. 
53.9.7, Keishu 32.6.1672).
Not surprisingly, we see the influence of the American 
precedents here. The question that a court has to address 
is twofold. Firstly, should the individual right to privacy be 
violated by police conduct, and, if the answer is positive, 
then secondly, is the exclusion of evidence appropriate or 
not. Accordingly, even if the right to privacy is violated, 
evidence might not be excluded. As a matter of fact, theo 7
Supreme Court of Japan held in that particular case that 
although die police officer's conduct (taking personal 
belongings out from pocket without consent) amounted to 
unlawful search without warrant or consent, taking all the 
circumstances into account, the illegality was not serious 
enough to exclude the crucial evidence of drug-related 
crime. Since then, although there are many lower court 
cases where the prosecution evidence was excluded 
because of the illegality of the investigation procedure, 
there is no Supreme Court case where the Court has 
actually excluded the prosecution evidence. The 
conviction rate is very high in Japan partly because the 
prosecution scrutinises cases and chooses serious ones 
backed up by strong evidence to indict. This might lead 
the Supreme Court to find that the strength of the 
prosecution case and the seriousness of crime 
predominate over the seriousness of the police 
misconduct and therefore not to exclude the evidence.
KEY UK JUDGMENTS AND IMPACT OF THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS
In 1992, the Court of Appeal held that to admit the 
evidence obtained by unwarranted interception of 
cordless telephone conversations was not unfair because 
there was no deliberate contravention of the law by the 
police, and probably because the offences charged were 
serious enough to outweigh the unfairness done to the 
defendants (R v Effik, RvMitchell [1992] Crim LR 580). In 
R v Khan [1996] 3 All ER 289, the appellant visited the 
home of another man to which the police, unknown to 
either of them, had attached a listening device, whereby 
the police obtained a tape recording of a conversation 
which showed that the appellant was involved in the 
importation of controlled drugs. The appellant 
contended, inter alia, that the admission of the tape 
recording would breach the right to respect for private life 
protected under art. 8 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights, and the judge should exercise his discretion to 
exclude it under s.78 of PACE 1984 because of that breach.
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The House of Lords held that:
(1) under English law, there was in general nothing 
unlawful about a breach of privacy, therefore even if 
the right to privacy existed, the tape recording was 
admissible as matter of law,
(2) the fact that the evidence was obtained in 
circumstances, which amounted to a breach of art. 8 
of the Convention, was relevant to, but not 
determinative of, the judge's discretion to admit or 
exclude such evidence under s.78.
The judge's discretion had to be exercised according toJo o
whether the admission of the evidence would render the trial 
unfair, and the use of material obtained in breach of rights of 
privacy did not itself mean that the trial would be unfair.
'It would be a strange reflection on our law if a man who has 
admitted his participation in the illegal importation of a large 
quantity of heroin should have his conviction set aside on the grounds 
that his privacy has been invaded. (R. v Khan supra, at 302).'
Article 8 of the European Convention as regards English 
law, and apart from the possible change of significance 
which may come along with the Human Rights Act 1998, it 
is interesting to see how die English approach to privacy 
differs from the American one (compare Katz v United 
States, 389 US 347 (1967)). The breach of individual 
privacy does not necessarily trigger the judge's discretional 
power either under common-law or under s.78. Then, 
when is the trial considered to be unfair?
In general, R v Quinn [1990] Crim LR 581 held that the 
function of the judge is to protect the fairness of the 
proceedings, and that the proceedings may become unfair, 
for example, where there has been an abuse of process, 
where evidence has been obtained in deliberate breach of 
procedures laid down in an official code of practice. But
'The merejact that there has been a breach of the Codes of 
Practice does not of itself mean that evidence has to be rejected. It 
is no part of the duty of the court to rule a [piece of evidence] 
inadmissible simply in order to punish the policeJbrjailure to 
observe the Codes of Practice (R. v. Delaney [1988] 153 JP 
103, at 106).'
In Matto v DTP [1987] Crim LR 641, where the police 
officers knowingly took a breath sample from a driver on his 
private property, the Divisional Court quashed the Crown 
Court conviction based on the illegality of the investigative 
procedure. The court found that the s.78 required the court 
to have regard to die way the evidence was obtained, and 
that at the breath test, the police were acting malajides in 
that they knew they were acting in excess of their powers. 
In R v Mason [1988] 86 Cr App R 349, the Court of Appeal 
held inadmissible under s.78 the confession obtained after 
the accused and his solicitor were falsely told by the police 
that the fingerprints of the accused had been found on the 
scene of crime. In R v Samuel [1988] 2 All ER 135 it was 
held that the refusal of access to the appellant's solicitor
before the interview without reasonable grounds was the 
denial of one of the most important and fundamental rights 
of a citizen, and therefore the admission of evidence of the 
interview was not allowed. In R v Canale [ 1990] 91 Cr App 
R 1, where the police officers did not take a 
contemporaneous note of the interviews, the court quashed 
the conviction because there were 'flagrant', 'deliberate' and 
'cynical' breaches of the Code of Practice, and because the 
most important evidence in the shape of a 
contemporaneous note was not available to the judge. And 
in R v Nathaniel [1995] 2 Cr App R 565, where the 
appellant's DNA profile was retained in breach of s. 64(1) 
of PACE and he was, in effect, misled in consenting to give77 o o
the blood sample, the Court of Appeal found that to allow 
the blood sample to be used in evidence at a trial would have 
had an adverse effect on the fairness of the trial.
On the other hand, it was held in the following
' o
situations that the evidence should not be excluded.
The appellant had been arrested on suspicion of the theft 
of a motorcycle. After he was cleared from that suspicion, 
the police officer went through the breath specimen's 
procedure without telling the appellant that he was no longer 
under suspicion for the theft or diat he was under arrest for 
another offence. The appellant failed to provide the 
specimens and was found guilty of refusing to provide the 
specimens without reasonable grounds. The court found 
diat there was neidier malajides nor impropriety to admit the 
evidence of breath specimen's procedure (Daniels v DPP 
[1992] 156 JP 543). When the police devised a subterfuge 
to arrest drug smugglers, and jewellery thieves and handlers, 
the evidence was admissible if the accused, unprovoked, 
acted under his own free will on the assumption that the 
facts were as he believed them to be (R v MacLean and Kosten 
[1993] Crim LR 687; R v Christou (1992) 95 Cr App R 264).
The accused was suspected of two different rapes. While 
he was under arrest for the second offence, on which he 
was later tried and acquitted, a sample of his hair was 
taken on die basis of an assurance given to the accused and
o
his solicitors that the sample would only be used in 
connection with the second offence. Instead of making a
o
comparison with the hair found at the scene of second 
offence, the police made a comparison with a body sample 
of die first offence and the result showed a match. Being 
uncertain about the admissibility of this evidence, the 
police requested the accused to give a further hair sample, 
which he initially refused to do, but after he was told that 
the police would take a sample by force and three officers 
entered the cell in riot headgear, he finally consented to 
give it. The court held diat the fairness of proceedings 
involves fairness to the public good as well as to the 
defence, and that the DNA profile provided very strong 
evidence of the offence. Even if the taking of the sample 
was not authorised by statute, this did not cast doubt on 
the accuracy or strength of the evidence and the evidence 
should not be excluded (R v Cooke [1995] Crim LR 497). 31
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The accused was suspected of stealing gas and electricity. 
Having been denied entry into his home, one of the 
officers of the electricity company, accompanied by police 
officers and armed with a warrant, kicked and knocked on 
the door so as to indicate his intention to forcibly enter if 
it was necessary, at which point the accused opened the 
door and was found to have used mechanical apparatus to 
bypass the gas and electricity supply recordings. The court 
held that even if there have been breaches of Code of 
Practice as to the entry, the admission of the evidence did 
not have any effect at all on the fairness of the 
proceedings. The apparatus was there for all to see, 
notwithstanding whether the entry was effectuated 
properly or not. Its existence was such that no possible 
injustice to the accused could have been occasioned (R v 
Stewart [1995] Crim LR 500).
A drug courier was intercepted at an airport and persuaded 
to make a call to the accused. The conversation was recorded 
and a transcript was presented before the court as evidence. 
The accused appealed, contending that the evidence should 
be excluded. The court held that the mere fact that the 
evidence was obtained by subterfuge did not necessarily lead 
to its exclusion. The courts had not gone so far as to say that 
all was fair in tackling with organised drug crimes, but they
o o o ' J
had not sought to limit the general common law principle 
that evidence might be, and usually was, admissible regardlesso ' J ' b
of the source from which it came and the means by which it 
was obtained. There was no special reason for unfairness in 
the present case (R v Cadette [1995] Crim LR 229).
JUDICIAL ATTITUDES TO EXCLUSION IN 
ENGLAND AND WALES, US AND JAPAN
According to the ruling of R v Latif[\996] 1 All ER 353 at 
361, in deciding whether to exclude illegally obtained 
evidence, the judge must weigh both the balance of the public 
interest in ensuring that those that are charged with seriouso o
crimes should be tried, as well as the competing public 
interest in not conveying the impression that the court will 
adopt the approach that the end justifies any means. In the 
end, the courts in England, in the United States, and in Japan 
adopt the same approach when facing the exclusion problem, 
i.e., by taking all the circumstances into account and weighing 
the costs and benefits of the exclusion. It is exclusion on a 
case-by-case basis, and as the commentary toRv Cooke noted, 
the courts seems to be reluctant to exclude evidence which 
clearly shows that an accused person has committed a serious 
offence (R v Cooke, supra, at 499).
However, the reasoning of the exclusion differs from
' o
country to country. American and Japanese courts seem to 
adhere to the deterrent theory. The rule's prime purpose 
is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby 
effectuate the guarantee of the Constitution against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. It is designed to 
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights through its general 
deterrent effect by removing the incentive to disregard it,
rather than a personal constitutional right of the party 
aggrieved (Elkins v United States, 364 US 206 at 217 (1960); 
United States v Calandra, 414 US 338 at 348, 349 (1974)). 
However, should a trial court predict or evaluate the 
deterrent effect of exclusion of evidence on future police 
conduct? According to that theory, a court, facing an 
exclusion submission from the defence, may exclude the 
evidence when the exclusion of certain evidence in that specific 
case might have a general deterrence effect on juture police 
misconduct. Is this the function of a criminal trial? Are trial 
courts capable of estimating the effect? It is true that one 
of the functions of the higher court is to establish a legal 
standard of the practice of the executive branch through its 
decisions. The exclusionary discretion exercised by the 
highest court may have a deterrent effect on future police 
conduct to the extent that it draws a legal line betweeno
what is lawful and what is not. But the courts do so in order 
to state what the law is, and not to supervise the executive.
As to this point, the English courts' stance stated in R v 
Mason is clear:
'This is not the place to discipline the police ... we are concerned 
with the application of the proper law. The law is ... that a trial 
judge has a discretion to be exercised, of course, upon right 
principles to reject admissible evidence in the interests of a 
defendant having a fair trial (R v Mason, supra at 354).'
Although the cases quoted above are not 
comprehensive, the English courts seem to exclude 
evidence under s.78 when
(1) police misconduct casts doubt on the reliability of 
the evidence, and
(2) police misconduct is so serious in the nature or in the 
way of breach that the admission of the evidence 
renders the judicial process unfair.
Finding the truth and punishing the criminals/acquitting 
the innocent is the primary concern of a criminal trial. 
But there is another important function: the protection of 
human rights. In a free society, where constitutional law 
guarantees fundamental human rights, the police powers 
also have to be subject to the constitutional law. If police 
practice exceeds the power vested by the constitutional 
law, or the practice breaches the fundamental principles, 
which are designed to protect fundamental human rights, 
the prosecution must not enjoy the fruit of that practice. 
The court does not punish or discipline the police, but the 
court should not use the evidence, which would not exist if 
the police have followed the fundamental principle. 
Convicting a defendant with the evidence, which could noto 7
have lawfully existed, would be unfair. @ 
Ryo Ogiso
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